1
The images of the nineteenth century are thus over-whelmingly of industry, cities, a self-satisfied middle-class, and urban poverty.
Intellectual histories of the nineteenth century have long been subservient to this historiography and its images. Recently, however, a complex variety of linguistic turns have freed intellectual and cultural history from the hegemony of social history, and they have also encouraged social and economic historians to challenge the old historiography of the nineteenth century. 2 Within both of these trends, we find a revisionist insistence on powerful continuities between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 3 Intellectual historians have followed into the nineteenth century political languages such as a popular radicalism committed to the people and political reform as opposed to the working-class and economic justice, or a discourse of commercial society that was concerned with the relationship between civility and trade. 4 Social and economic historians have begun to 3 highlight the long, slow, and ambivalent nature of the Industrial Revolution, and the persistence of traditional technologies and workshop production. 5 John Burrow and Donald Winch have been at the forefront of moves to rethink the intellectual history of the nineteenth century in Britain. 6 As two volumes of essays recently published in their honor indicate, their work prompts us to move from a narrow focus on Queen Victoria's reign to a long view stretching from 1750 to 1950. 7 How might we periodize intellectual history? What is at stake here in historiographic terms?
And what can we learn here from Burrow, Winch, and their colleagues?
Before we answer these questions, we usefully might reflect very briefly on the nature of questions of periodization. Most intellectual historians today are suspicious of any appeal to Platonic forms or a Hegelian logic informing concrete historical particulars.
Certainly I favor the nominalist view that history consists solely of particular utterances, texts, and beliefs, albeit that these are produced and understood in constant dialogue and interaction with one another. A similar nominalism appears, moreover, to inform, at least to some extent, the historicism of the Cambridge School with which Burrow and Winch are loosely associated. 8 Anyway, if we take nominalism seriously, as I think we should, we will conclude that historical periods do not come in ready individuated parcels with clear boundaries. Rather, we individuate history into chunks of time or intellectual traditions for our purposes, so the way we seek to justify our periods or traditions should be by reference to that which we want to use them to explain. 9 Nominalism suggests that every utterance represents a beginning in the sense of being a moment of creativity, but no utterance represents a beginning in the sense of being entirely uninfluenced by social traditions. When historians clump utterances, beliefs, or thinkers into traditions or when 4 they highlight moments when traditions underwent especially notable change in response to dilemmas, they can define and justify the relevant clumps only by reference to their purposes -to that which they wish to explain. When, as now, we do not want to explain anything in particular, but rather to survey an era, we should avoid reifying any one way of splitting time or of clumping thinkers as if it had a definite beginning, a monolithic content, or a precise end. We should explore the long intellectual history of the nineteenth century as a series of over-lapping beginnings, contents, and endings.
Beginnings
Burrow and Winch focus on the human sciences -history, economics, politics, and sociology -while remaining sensitive to the impact thereon of other domains of thought -the natural sciences as well as philosophy and theology. The Enlightenment, of course, profoundly influenced all these domains. Indeed, when Burrow and Winch reach back before 1800, they characteristically do so in order to draw out the debt of later social thinkers to themes emanating from the Scottish Enlightenment. The Enlightenment thus represents one prominent beginning to the long nineteenth century; one we might locate around 1750.
The Cambridge School has traced two main political languages through early modern Britain -natural jurisprudence and civic humanism. When Winch and others reread the Scottish Enlightenment in relation to these languages, they challenge the teleological reading of classical political economy in which Adam Smith appears as the founding father of modern economics.
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Adam Smith, as Winch and others remind us, sought to develop "the science of the statesman or legislator": he examined the operation 5 of sympathy and prudence in the context of moral and psychological theories that are clearly contrary to the selfish, individualistic, and utilitarian assumptions of the modern economist. In addition, the Cambridge School has thus made us aware of the diverse contexts and contents of Enlightenment. The Parisian philosophes with their fervent secularism appear now as just one strand with a plurality of enlightenments that included protestant and ecclesiastical moments, such as the Scottish one and even an English one associated with Edward Gibbon.
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This emphasis on the particularity and diversity of enlightenment thought should not obscure the fairly dramatic changes it wrought in what had gone before. 12 Metropolitan life and commerce posed dilemmas for the traditions of natural jurisprudence and civic humanism, and Enlightenment thinkers transformed both traditions in response to these dilemmas. So, for example, liberty became associated less with self-sufficiency than with sociability and exchange, where the Enlightenment science of society then understood sociability in terms of a conjectural "stadial" historiography, and exchange in terms analogous to the movement of the planets. Duncan Forbes, a precursor of the Cambridge School, distinguished between the rationalism of the Scottish Enlightenment and the romanticism of Liberal Anglicans such as Thomas Arnold. 13 The work of Winch and others on the Enlightenment has been seen as a critique of this dichotomy in that it problematises the rationalism of the former by emphasizing both its moral aspects and its continuities with natural jurisprudence and civic humanism. Yet we might rescue a version of Forbes's distinction -understood now as two waves of fairly dramatic change -if we expand our concept of romanticism in the same way as the Cambridge School have our concept of Enlightenment. 14 Indeed when historians such as Winch rescue the Enlightenment from the crude rationalism with which 6 a simple contrast with the romantics used to associate it, they often set their histories up in explicit opposition to one we associate with romanticism. For example, when Mark Philips provides us with a richer understanding of enlightenment ideas of historical distance, he contrasts them with the romantic ideas of sympathy and identification. 15 Romanticism thus represents a second beginning to the long nineteenth century; one we might locate around 1790.
The impact of romanticism brought concerns with agency, imagination, creativity, and the inner life of the mind, and it thereby challenged historiographical assumptions embedded in the Scottish Enlightenment. To some extent, romanticism represents a response by those with religious faith to the secular histories of Enlightenment. Yet, as J. G. A. Pocock's study of Gibbon reminds us, the English, and we might add the Scottish, Enlightenment contained within it greater latitude of belief than was found among the philosophes. To grasp the nature of the beginning associated with romanticism, we have to relate it less to a narrow counter-enlightenment and more to a broad concern with the organic. The romantics rejected the Enlightenment view of mind as passive and inert.
They emphasized the living nature of the inorganic -at times even assimilating the organic to the inorganic -and thus the ability of living things to create a fluid, changing order for themselves through activity infused with purpose, thought, and imagination. To grasp the nature of the beginning associated with romanticism, we also have to recognize the particularity and diversity of national romanticisms, just as the Cambridge School do with Enlightenment. For example, even if British thought remained more universalistic and monogenetic than did German or French, it still broke with the Enlightenment in its concern with the organic, change, and imagination. 16 The broad shift here associated 7 with romanticism appears throughout the sciences in the first half of the nineteenth century when questions of time, dynamics, and evolution challenged those of system, statics, and balance. So understood, of course, romanticism brought in its wake not only a new emphasis on imaginative sympathy with the inner lives of agents but also the rise of evolutionary approaches to the human sciences as discussed in Burrow's Evolution and Society.
While the Enlightenment and romanticism, with their inner diversities, represent the two great pan-European beginnings to the modern age, Britain also experienced more parochial beginnings. 17 Perhaps the most important of these -a third beginning to the long nineteenth century -was evangelicalism, which we might date around 1800. As Boyd Hilton has shown, the social and economic thought associated with evangelicalism had much in common with that emerging out of the Scottish Enlightenment. 18 It too represented a response to dilemmas such as commercialism and trade cycles, although it was also a response to new concerns posed by the French Revolution and English Jacobinism. Evangelical moralists sought to make sense of these dilemmas in explicitly theological terms. Characteristically they understood the commercial upheavals of the day alongside other calamities such as wars, revolutions, famines, and pestilence -they were sufferings that reflected God's justice. While such distinctions are rarely neat and tidy, Hilton does well to suggest that while Whigs often draw on enlightenment ideas, Tories owed more to evangelicalism, and that, within the later group, the extreme evangelicals -notably Lord Shaftsbury -believed God intervened continuously in human affairs, whereas Liberal Tories -notably the Clapham Sect -saw nature as more regular in a way which enabled them to adopt enlightenment ideas of economy. God had made the world so that natural laws operated to reward virtue and punish sin.
From this perspective, for example, Malthusian economics represented the discovery of the laws established by a benevolent God. 19 While the idle pursuit of pleasure would bring disaster and poverty, to recognize God's will (and Malthus's truths) and then act in a prudent manner would bring rewards. Hence, any attempt to protect improvident workers or businessmen who went bankrupt from the natural consequences of their sin was regarded not only as bad economics but also as contrary to the will of God. Poverty constituted a form of atonement by which one paid for one's sins. While evangelicalism thus overlapped with enlightenment economy, it also constituted a distinct movement of thought wedded to Protestant notions of character, duty, sacrifice, and truth. It linked economic concepts to these Protestant ones far more strongly than to those of sociability, manners, and sympathy. Evangelicalism also established a distinct domestic ideology.
Social order and individual character depended on sacrifice and duty, both of which had to be defined by the Church and instilled by the family. Strict notions of appropriateness thus defined familial roles, such that, for instance, women were generally restricted to being obedient daughters, wives, and mothers. 20 
Contents
Much of the intellectual history of the nineteenth century consists of the gradual development and transformation of enlightenment, romantic, and evangelical ideas. But that is not quite the right way to describe their book, for while it begins with early nineteenth century economists who clearly were indebted to "the system of Edinburgh", it goes on to consider later political thinkers, such as Walter Bagehot, who expressed hostility to just this system -it is these later thinkers who inspire their most nuanced, but also most awkward, readings. The historical issue here is the relationship of the liberalism of the middle of the nineteenth century to the variety of Whiggism that emerged out of the Scottish Enlightenment. Collini, Burrow, and Winch want to stress the continuities between the two.
Whatever we make of the relationship of Liberalism to Whiggism, we should think about the content of nineteenth century thought in relation to all our beginnings, evangelicalism and romanticism as well as the Scottish Enlightenment. For a start, Hilton seems to be pretty much right when he suggests evangelical thought played a more important role than classical political economy, let alone utilitarianism, in inspiring the loosely laissez-faire, free-trade individualism that proved so prevalent in the first half of the nineteenth-century. Winch, of course, has devoted considerable attention to figures such as Malthus in a way that has helped to direct historians of economic theory away from a simplistic lineage running from Smith through Ricardo to J. S. Mill.
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Yet it is 10 from Boyd Hilton we learn to suspect that too great an emphasis on the Enlightenment's legacy might obscure themes found in much of the political economy of the nineteenth century. Notions of catastrophe and of God's plan were at least as significant as those of economic rationality, sociability, or a natural system. In addition, we are, I believe, only starting to appreciate the ways in which a romantic organicism played itself out through much of the social thought of the nineteenth century. Burrow, of course, has drawn our attention to the attempts by Herbert Spencer, Sir Henry Maine, and E. B. Tylor to explore cultural diversity, and he has thereby helped to direct historians of evolutionary thinking away from a simplistic focus on Darwin. Yet it is from historians of science that we learn to locate such evolutionary thinking in the context of the broad concern with the organic I have linked to romanticism. Liberalism, I am suggesting, differed significantly from earlier Whig ideas, in large part because of the influence of a romantic organicism but also because of the impact of a more radical enlightenment best represented by Jeremy Bentham. 24 To say this is not to deny the persistence of Scottish Enlightenment and Whig thought late in nineteenth century, nor that Whig thought offered an alternative to utilitarianism, nor yet that there is some continuity of themes between such thought and Liberalism. It is, rather, to draw our attention to the extent and manner in which Liberalism broke with such thought. 25 One aspect of this break arises from the debt Liberalism owed utilitarianism and its individualistic psychology.
commerce, the rule of law, and Whig constitutionalism. 29 Similarly, J. S. Mill's ethical theory remained utilitarian in inspiration even as he sought to modify it to allow that selfinterest was insufficient as a criterion of goodness. Even after he rejected Bentham's formulation of utilitarianism, he continued to "regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions," adding only that "it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being." toward, say, a concern with national character reflect principally the impact of the romantics. Likewise, the limits to his romanticism -say, his analysis of national character in terms of laws and the physical environment as opposed to a national or racial spirit -reflect principally his clear debt to philosophic radicalism. We should not be surprised, therefore, to find that Liberals less firmly rooted in Benthamism often took a more romantic line, including, at least among the University Liberals, a belief in biological or racial characters apparent in national histories. 34 Liberalism represents a fourth beginning, quite distinct from, though infused by, the Scottish Enlightenment and romanticism. As a beginning, moreover, it played an integral part in defining the content of nineteenth-century thought. We might even suggest that the dominant intellectual current of the middle and late nineteenth century was Liberalism combined with evangelical notions of truth, duty, and a related concern to raise the moral tone of the individual members of society. 35 We also might suggest that this intellectual combination found a loose political expression in the popular liberalism of Gladstone's times that so dislocated the Whigs. Hence, whereas Burrow concludes, "the Whig line was held" against romanticism even if this was a tight thing, we might suggest that romantic organicism -especially when located alongside utilitarianismdecisively transformed the Whig line thereby leading to a rupture associated with Liberalism. 36 Of course, to recognize that Liberalism differs from Whiggism, and that it does so because it has roots in utilitarianism, romanticism, and evangelicalism, is not to imply nineteenth-century Liberals believed in markets and democracy understood in the terms since bequeathed to us, and read into them, by neoliberal apologists such as F. A.
Hayek. Far from believing in pure markets, nineteenth-century Liberals remained very ambivalent about the inroads the market economy seemed to be making in civil society.
J. S. Mill argued, "the most serious danger to the future prospects of mankind is in the unbalanced influence of the commercial spirit." 37 Similarly, instead of treating all democratic citizens equally, nineteenth-century Liberals were moral or intellectual elitists, often fairly contemptuous of the common people. We might think here of J. S. socialists. While Thomas Paine is a major figure here, we now have studies that take the story forward to radicals and socialists throughout the nineteenth century. 39 Nineteenth century popular radicals and socialists, we now know, continued to regard political reform as a means of transforming a corrupt state so as to ensure the well-being of a virtuous people. Concerns with class and economic exploitation often came later, and even then they often did so in a framework of civic humanism. We also have studies that explore the influence of traditions such as civic humanism and natural jurisprudence upon popular Toryism and loyalism in the early nineteenth century. 40 No doubt the neglect of popular culture by Burrow, Winch, and their colleagues derives from a natural concern to study "what one finds interesting." 41 Yet maybe it also reflects, at least to some extent, the hegemony of social history over the study of popular practices and movements, a hegemony that encourages intellectual historians to restrict their studies to high culture. Whether or not this is so, it seems clear that we can hope to deploy the work of Burrow, Winch, and their colleagues to offer a new historiography of the nineteenth century taken as some kind of whole only by exploring popular culture.
We need to know not only about the intellectual and political elite, but also about how their ideas, and the policies they fought for, both played to and impacted on other groups in society. 42 We need to bring the work of Burrow, Winch, and their colleagues together with similar work on popular liberalism, feminism, and, for that matter, popular religious movements, scientific thought, and popular political economy. 43 So far I have deliberately neglected the postmodern strand in recent readings of popular culture. 44 Although the postmodernists explore intellectual or cultural history as do Burrow, Winch, and Stedman Jones, they do so from a notably different theoretical position. Although social contexts often have an enormous influence on the ideas and actions of individuals, this does not imply we should cease to treat ideas as the properties of individuals or cultural practices as the products of human agency; it means only that the ideas and actions individuals adopt exhibit the influence of social forces rather than being the products of autonomous reasoning. All too often, however, postmodernists treat ideas and culture as fixed by a quasi-structure in a way that appears to rule out agency as well as autonomy. As a result, postmodern histories of nineteenth-century culture, for all their energy and all their verve, characteristically remain blind to two significant issues. The first is the diverse beliefs people hold on any topic: because postmodernists postulate quasi-structures, they tend to look for shared conventional or linguistic meanings, often conceived as binary oppositions, rather than the diverse beliefs agents express in speech and action using these conventions. The second blind-spot of postmodernism covers the ways discourses, ideas, or beliefs change over time: the postmodernists suspicion of the real precludes their appealing to social or economic experience as a source of change, and their reduction of meanings to quasi-structures precludes their explaining change in terms of agency. One might hope that historians such as Burrow and Winch will help to draw attention to these blind-spots.
Another significant development within the study of nineteenth-century culture has been the surge of interest in issues of race and Empire. These issues have been addressed mainly from within quasi-structural perspectives such as postmodernism. 45 As such, they provide a good example of areas in which we might hope Burrow, Winch, and their colleagues might draw attention to the diverse and changing nature of nineteenthcentury beliefs. To some extent, they already have begun to do so. Peter Mandler, for example, has explored notions of race and nation in the Whiggism that emerged out of the Scottish Enlightenment -by concentrating on the historians and anthropologists about whom Burrow has written so extensively. 46 Throughout the nineteenth-century, historical and Whig thought led, according to Mandler, to a civilizational perspective that remained hostile to organic concepts of race and nation and that possessed instead a universalist character.
There are, I suspect, partially hidden ethical debates at play here. Postcolonialists want to condemn the civilizational perspective as racist, and they do so by assimilating it to the organic one. If this is so, then their hidden ethical argument ignores the sorts of subtleties explored in Jacques Derrida's discussion of Martin Heidegger's spiritual racism -which resembles the civilizational perspective -in relation to the biological racism of the Nazi's -which had a more organic quality. 47 As Derrida shows, we can recognize a certain similarity between the two, and we can thus pose awkward questions to the former, without thereby conflating them. We can recognize the dangers lurking in the civilizational perspective whilst allowing that these are not as great as those of biological racism, and even that more is lost than gained by suggesting otherwise. Besides, surely we should at least distinguish the two as different modes of thought before exploring how and why they do or do not lead to similar ethical dangers? Surely we should not elide the two because of some naïve assumption that thought on race and on nation is inevitably structured by binary oppositions and the possibilities that these provide? Indeed, because postcolonial historians have taught us to think about the impact of western discourses on colonial and postcolonial thought, it is worth pointing out that to neglect the civilizational perspective is to miss one of the main sets of arguments that nationalists used against the Empire.
48
Instead of reading-off a monolithic nineteenth-century discourse on race and nation from some quasi-structural, binary opposition, Mandler examines the actual beliefs people expressed. Unfortunately, however, he does not adequately bring out the diversity of these beliefs because, like several of Burrow and Winch's colleagues, he takes British culture to be the almost exclusive preserve of Whigs. Here, then, our earlier insistence on romanticism, evangelicalism, and Liberalism as distinct beginnings might lead us to modify Mandler's argument. Even while we allow that a civilizational perspective remained dominant over any attempt to think an organic and racial nationalism, we should not let this obscure either the virulent hostility of many evangelicals and utilitarian Liberals to other cultures, or the extent to which strands of nineteenth century thought drew on romanticism and organicism to sustain theories of social evolution, at times even an abrasive social Darwinism. Nineteenth-century thought included strong biological strands of racism, in, for example, the eugenics movement. 49 One way of making such hostilities and racism clearer might be, once again, to extend the approach of Burrow and Winch to areas over which social history long held sway, such as the everyday practices of Empire. After all, as Mandler rightly observes, "in practice, imperial responsibilities might elicit harsher and more pessimistic responses, in which the image was not so much of a 'superior race' converting others 'into efficient members of a free community' . . . but rather the superior race making its superiority felt by discipline, violence, and even extermination." 50 
Endings
The endings of the long nineteenth century, like its contents, reflect its beginnings in the Enlightenment, romanticism, evangelicalism, and Liberalism. Yet Burrow, Winch, and their colleagues, are less useful guides to the endings than to the beginnings and contents. Of course, this principally reflects the temporal span of the bulk of their work. Having sought to rescue Liberalism as a distinct beginning, I want immediately to bury it. Liberalism merged classical political economy with utilitarianism while also modifying them both to allow for a more organic outlook. In the 1860s, however, J. S.
Mill renounced the wages fund doctrine, which had been integral to classical political economy since Ricardo. 53 More generally, classical political economists confronted uncomfortable statistical evidence that during the 1850s and 1860s trade unions had expanded, wages and living conditions had risen, and there had been a population boom.
This evidence combined to undermine the two leading doctrines of the classical theory of distribution. On the one hand, the idea that trades unions could raise wages challenged the wages-fund theory according to which there is in the short term a fixed amount of savings to pay wages. On the other, the concurrence of rising living standards and a population boom challenged the Malthusian idea that population growth responded to wages so as to ensure a "natural" tendency to subsistence wages. Classical political economy, and with it Liberalism, thus came to an end around 1875.
Bagehot famously pronounced political economy dead "in the public mind." For many later economists, then, the market was an inherently efficient way of allocating resources within the frame of a stable equilibrium. Neoclassical economics thus provided neoliberals with a novel argument, on purely economic grounds, against intervention by the state. When economists, following J. M. Keynes, advocated state intervention, they did so because they thought the operation of the market let to an imperfect equilibrium and the state could put this right by appropriate, periodic interventions.
22
The next ending to the long nineteenth century, one we might date around 1880, was that of evangelicalism. 56 Late Victorians increasingly responded to dilemmas such as geology, historical criticism of the Bible, and the theory of evolution by moving from an Atonement theology to an Incarnational one and also to other forms of immanentist thought. The Victorian crisis of faith arose in part because of Darwin's presentation of the theory of evolution. Recently historians of science have taught us to push back the date of Darwin's discovery, locating it more firmly in the context of existing biological thought. 57 Burrow had earlier taught us that theories of social evolution were up and running before Darwin, and that they often neglected the distinctive ideas Darwin did introduce. Together these teachings suggest we think of evolutionary theory as a product of the romantic organicism that begun around 1790. Equally, we might see the Victorian crisis of faith not as an inexorable secularization but as the fall of evangelicalism under pressure from organic romanticism. We then could take on board all the recent work that suggests the crisis of faith did not lead to secularization so much as complex shifts in religious thought and practice. 58 Geological discoveries, historical studies of the Bible, moral doubts, and evolutionary theory all combined to prompt a shift from a view of God as a transcendent judge to one of God as present in the world and working through evolution processes so as to realize his will.
Religious thought thus came to emphasize God's immanent presence in the world.
Christians, for example, stressed his incarnation in Jesus, the importance of the Church he established, and the basis for faith provided by our inner moral voice. Immanentists as diverse as the Anglican J. R. Illingworth, the Congregationalist R. J. Campbell, and Besant in her theosophical guise believed in the existence of an inner reality, the unity of all things, and the purposive nature of evolution: God was in each of us, uniting us in a single spiritual whole, and guiding this whole towards a spiritual fulfillment consisting largely of a self-conscious awareness of divine unity. Such immanentism replaced the evangelical stress on a transcendent God who had instituted static, natural laws to reward virtue and punish sin. It also promoted a new ethic. God's presence in us, immanentists believed, unites us in a universal fellowship that requires us to look to the material as well as moral uplift of the unfortunate. Increasingly cooperative and social moralities thus augmented or replaced evangelical individualism. At times, moreover, the state came to stand as an expression of our unity and so a vehicle for social reform in a way that gradually eroded the almost entirely formal role given to the state by earlier thinkers.
Although evangelical notions such as truth, duty, and sacrifice continued to retain a hold on the ethical imagination, there content changed dramatically in ways suggested by Beatrice Webb when she wrote of the "transference of the emotion of self-sacrificing service from God to man." 59 In some respects, then, we can date the end of the long nineteenth century around 1890. The decline of Liberalism and evangelicalism saw the rise of various movements that were at odds with the cultures of the beginning and the middle of the long nineteenth century, movements such as philosophical idealism, theosophy, Christian socialism, and the new liberalism. In other respects, however, these new movements -this new culture -still exhibits clear continuities with romantic organicism and Enlightenment Whiggism.
Thus, we might delay the end of the long nineteenth century until modernism and World War One end these continuities.
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We might date the ending of romanticism, together with emergence of Bloomsbury, around 1910. 60 While the Victorian crisis of faith inspired an immanentism that reflected the impact of evolutionary, organic, and romantic thought, it also gave rise to modernist forms of skepticism that were contrary to this immanentism. It could make nineteenth-century narratives of universal progress appear too optimistic and ambitious.
And it could make nineteenth-century notions of truth and duty appear too rigid and too austere, perhaps even hypocritical shams. Modernism thus embodied more cautious and more constrained, less self-confident, ways of knowing and being. 61 Scientists and social thinkers shifted their focus from wholes and their evolution to atomistic and analytical studies of discrete, discontinuous elements and their assemblage. Graham Wallas called for a political science based on the quantitative study of actual behavior, not deductions from assumptions about reason, character, and social evolution. 62 Similarly, artists and moralists, notably the Bloomsbury group, turned from individual and social duties to good states of mind and personal relations. Keynes recalled how his acceptance of G. E.
Moore's view about the good in relation to oneself "made morals unnecessary" at least with respect to social duty. 63 At the edge of such modernism, moreover, we find ideas of self-reference, incompleteness, and radical subjectivity that were almost entirely absent from earlier thinking.
The experience of World War One decisively reinforced the modernist break with romantic and Enlightenment thinking. The War shattered belief in progress and reason.
It undermined the romantic belief in the role of sprit or purpose within the organic, the Enlightenment conviction of the triumph of reason, and a Whig view of character and social evolution. History and social life could scarcely be seen any longer as expressions 25 of moral character or the philosophical and historical evolution of reason. Action had been conduct infused with reason, morality, and purpose. Now it increasingly became behavior to be analyzed either apart from any assumptions about mind or in relation to hidden desires and depths that often overpowered reason and morals. The final end of the long nineteenth century thus coincides with the rise of new approaches to the human sciences such as structuralism, behaviorism, and psychoanalysis. Even when political scientists pursued the study of comparative institutions in a way made familiar by James Bryce, they increasingly began to treat each institution as a discrete atom to be compared and classified with similar atoms in other systems, rather than as part of a whole political system to be understood in terms of its historical evolution. What is more, because the loss of faith in progress and reason left many people morally adrift, the final end of the long nineteenth century also coincides with the rise of new ethics, including not only the private values of art and friendship, but also utopias premised on an absolute revolutionary break with existing social life.
Of course, the end of the long nineteenth century did not happen all at once. Up until at least 1940 aspects of Enlightenment Whiggism, romanticism, evangelicalism, and Liberalism remained prominent within British culture. Keynes, a member of Bloomsbury and an analytical economist, was in many respects as much a Victorian as a modernist. 64 Nonetheless, the long nineteenth-century had come to an end by 1918, and those aspects of its culture that persisted thereafter are generally full of self-doubt and nostalgia. A committed nominalism, I have suggested, prompts us to treat questions of periodization in a pragmatic manner, so that if we are seeking to characterize a period as a whole, we will do so in terms of a series of over-lapping beginnings, contents, and endings. In the case of the long nineteenth century, moreover, we fruitfully might characterize the beginnings, contents, and endings as the Enlightenment, romanticism, evangelicalism, and Liberalism. To do so, of course, is to take a broader perspective than that implicit in the emphasis Burrow, Winch, and their colleagues characteristically place on Whiggism. Indeed, I have suggested that in so far as we can postulate a dominant nineteenth-century culture, it was probably a Liberalism infused with evangelicalism.
Alongside such liberalism, however, we need to set not only Whiggism as it emerged out of the Scottish Enlightenment, but also other expressions of both romantic organicism and evangelicalism. Equally, we should recognize that strands of the ending of each of these modes of thought can be found weaving its way back through nineteenth-century culture. Doubts about the political economy are already widespread by the late 1860s. Collectively these endings led to an intellectual world very different from that of the long nineteenth century. For a start, the immanentist break with Atonement theology inspired a shift from notions of individual duty to community. In addition, the shift from romanticism and enlightenment thought to modernism inspired a shift from the study of the organic conceived in terms of reason to the analysis of atomized units in relation to hidden patterns and forces. Of course, the twentieth century, like the long nineteenth, contained diverse traditions with varied beginnings, contents, and endings. Still, while the dominant tone for much of the nineteenth century was perhaps a Liberalism infused with evangelical notions of truth, duty, and a related concern to raise up the moral tone of individuals, that which dominated much of the twentieth century was perhaps a social welfarism infused with specialist notions of expertise spread over constantly growing and more finely divided areas of society. The transition from the former to the latter was drawn out and gradual. But it did occur, and its doing so says much about why the world of 1950 looked so different from that of 1850.
